

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 FEA-02 AGR-20 CEA-02 CIAE-00 COME-00

EB-11 FRB-02 H-03 INR-10 INT-08 L-03 LAB-06 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 AID-20 CIEP-02 SS-20 STR-08

TAR-02 TRSE-00 USIA-15 PRS-01 SP-03 OMB-01 SWF-02

ISO-00 SPM-01 AEC-11 SCI-06 DRC-01 ARA-16 EA-11

EUR-25 NEA-14 /263 W

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R 121730Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7678

INFO USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 DAKAR 3912

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, SG, SR, YO, RO, MT, UN, EGEN

SUBJ: NON-ALIGNED ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

REF: STATE 99106

1. SUMMARY.

A. EMBASSY SUGGESTS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICIES WITH REGARD TO LDCA THAN
THAT EXPRESSED BY U.S. AT RECENT SPECIAL SESSION UNGA
AND IMPROVED MECHANISM FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH LDCA
ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WE PROPOSE
DEPARTMENT'S FORTHCOMING STUDY CONSIDER OUR SUGGESTION
OF MODIFIED APPROACH WHICH GROWS OUT OF REFLECTION ON
SENEGALESE ATTITUDES AND POLICIES CONCERNING NON-
ALIGNED CONFERENCE GROUP (NACG) AND NACG POLICIES.

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B. EMBASSY BELIEVES CONCERN EXPRESSED BY DEPARTMENT

OVER RAMIFICATIONS UNITED NACG ACTION REFLECTS NEW U.S. AWARENESS OF LDC POWER BUT NOTES THAT U.S. APPEARS TO HAVE MADE FEW CONCESSIONS TO ACCOMMODATE TO THAT POWER. SIMILARLY, U.S. APPROACHES TO RESOLUTION OF WORLD'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MAY HAVE GIVEN INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO LDC VIEWS OF LDC NEEDS. MANY LDCS DO NOT REGARD ENERGY CRISIS AS WORLD'S FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT PROBLEM TO BE LOW PRICES OF LDC EXPORTS AND DETERIORATING TERMS OF TRADE. IN THAT REGARD, U.S. MAY OVERESTIMATE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN SEPARATE ARABS AND AFRICANS ON RAW MATERIALS AND OTHER ECONOMIC ISSUES OF CONCERN TO NACG. IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF NACG MAJORITY PROBLEM, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT WHILE INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS IS FUNDAMENTAL FACT, THE DIVISION BETWEEN HAVES AND HAVE NOTS AND, INEVITABILITY, SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN THEM, IS A CONSIDERATION OF EQUAL WEIGHT FOR LDCS.

C. WE SUGGEST OUR NATIONAL INTEREST ULTIMATELY MAY BE SERVED BY (1) MORE REALISTIC U.S. POSTURES IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND IN FRAMEWORK BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LDCS RECOGNIZING DC-LDC INTERESTS ARE IN FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT AND ACCEPTING COROLLARY THAT U.S. MUST EXPECT INCREASING LDC UNITY WHICH WILL HAVE INCREASING IMPACT ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS; (2) MORE THOROUGH CONSIDERATION LDC VIEWS, INCLUDING SERIOUS EXAMINATION SDR LINK, COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, AND LINK BETWEEN EXPORT AND IMPORT PRICES OF LDCS; (3) AVOIDANCE OF FUTILE RHETORICAL BATTLES AND VOTE GETTING CAMPAIGNS; AND (4) EXPANDED EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN IMPORTANCE LDCS TO U.S. CONGRESS AND PUBLIC. AS MEANS OF DEVELOPING GREATER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING U.S. AND LDC ATTITUDES, WE ALSO RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT CONSIDER ESTABLISHING HIGH LEVEL SPECIAL OFFICE, HEADED BY AMERICAN OF AMBASSADORIAL RANK WITH DISTINGUISHED REPUTATION IN ECONOMIC POLICY AREA, TO CONFER WITH KEY FORMULATORS OF ECONOMIC POLICY WE ARE ABLE IDENTIFY IN LDCS. SUCH A SPECIAL OFFICE WOULD RESEMBLE U.S. HALF OF CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS SUCH AS WE USE WITH REGARD ECONOMIC RELATIONS JAPAN AND RECENTLY SAUDI ARABIA, WITH DIFFERENCE ORGANISM WOULD BE PERMANENT, CONFIDENTIAL

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WOULD BE SMALL, WOULD MEET WITH LEADERS IN MANY COUNTRIES AND ONLY IN ABSENCE OF OTHER BILATERAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

2. RECENT LOS CONFERENCE AND RAW MATERIALS PROBLEMS HAVE FOCUSED ATTENTION ON LDC POWER. IF, AS STATE A-4568 INDICATES RE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION, NACG STEAMROLLER IS

SOURCE OF MAJOR CONCERN, THEN IT CAN ONLY BE BECAUSE OF INCREASED CAPABILITY LDCS TO AFFECT OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IF NOT, AND IF LDCS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE UNABLE GREATLY AFFECT OUR INTERESTS, THEN MEASURES PROPOSED THIS CABLE UNNECESSARY AND ITS CONCEPTUAL BASIS INVALID.

3. PRESIDENT SENGHOR HAS REPEATEDLY HARPED ON DETERIORATING TERMS OF TRADE AS GREATEST ECONOMIC PROBLEM FACING SENEGAL. THIS WE UNDERSTAND ALSO MAJOR THESE OF SPECIAL SESSION UNGA AT WHICH ENERGY CRISIS GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT. FURTHER PROOF OF LDC CONCERN THIS ISSUE WAS (1) REFUSAL MAJORITY AFRICANS, AMONG OTHERS, TO CRITICIZE ARABS IN UNGA SPECIAL SESSION WITH REGARD OIL PRICE ISSUE AND (2) SUCCESS OF ARGUMENT THAT ALL PRICES LDC RAW MATERIAL EXPORTS NEEDED BE RAISED IN LIEU OF DECREASING OIL PRICES. EMBASSY BELIEVES U.S. -- WITHOUT MINIMIZING EFFECTS OF INCREASED OIL PRICES ON LDCS -- SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE LDC CONCERN OVER TERMS OF TRADE AND MEET THAT CONCERN DIRECTLY. WE SHOULD STUDY JOINTLY WITH LDCS FACTUAL BASIS FOR CLAIM OF DETERIORATION AND MEANS TO ALLEVIATE THAT DETERIORATION IF IT OCCURRING. IF WE HAVE GOOD CASE THAT NO DETERIORATION TAKING PLACE, WE SHOULD MAKE CONCERTED EFFORT GET THIS ACROSS TO LDC LEADERS. EMBASSY DAKAR, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES NOT HAVE FACTS AVAILABLE TO REFUTE PKC ARGUMENT AND WOULD WELCOME THEM IF THEY CAN BE PROVIDED BY DEPARTMENT. SINCE COMPLAINING ABOUT DETERIORATION OF TERMS OF TRADE IS POLITICALLY USEFUL SCAPEGOAT FOR LDC LEADERS WHOSE COUNTRIES IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY, WE SEE NO EARLY END OF DENUNCIATION DC POLICY IN THOSE TERMS. HOWEVER, MUCH COULD BE DONE TO UNDERCUT SUCH CRITICISM.

4. U.S. SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE BASIC CONFLICT OF INTEREST

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SWF-02 SPM-01 AEC-11 SCI-06 DRC-01 ARA-16 EA-11

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 DAKAR 3912

WITH LDC'S WHICH MAY DEFY SHORT RUN SOLUTION. LDC'S DESIRE, THROUGH ALTERING TERMS OF TRADE, TO AUGMENT THEIR SHARE OF WORLD'S WEALTH AND LESSEN ECONOMIC GAP BETWEEN LDC'S AND DC'S. THEY SEE THIS NOT SIMPLY AS QUESTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BUT ALSO AS QUESTION OF REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH COUNTRY. U.S. ECONOMIC AID IS RECOGNITION OF NEED REDISTRIBUTE INCOME BY TRANSFER RESOURCES TO LDC'S. BUT U.S. TRADE POLICY HAS BEEN MORE OR LESS OPPOSED, IN PRACTICE IF NOT IN THEORY, TO ALTERING TERMS OF TRADE IN FAVOR OF LDC'S, THAT IS, PAYING MORE -- RELATIVE TO PRICES ON EXPORTS -- FOR OUR IMPORTS FROM LDC'S. THIS NATURAL DESIRE ON OUR PART PUTS US IN FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION TO LDC'S, WHO ARE SEEKING NOT CONCESSION FOR CONCESSION AS IN GATT, OR EVEN SOLEY GENERALIZED PREFERENCES FOR LDC'S, AS IN TRADE BILL CURRENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS, BUT HIGHER PRICES FOR THEIR EXPORTS. U.S. MAY BE ABLE ACCOMMODATE TO SOME OF THIS DEMAND BUT IT INEVITABLE THAT AS BUYER OF LDC EXPORTS WE ARE IN CONTINUING CONFLICT OVER EXPORT PRICES WHICH ARE BECOMING CONFIDENTIAL

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A CENTRAL FOCUS OF LDC ASPIRATIONS AND DEMANDS. GIVEN CURRENT SIZE INCOME GAP BETWEEN DC'S AND LDC'S, NO EFFORTS PRESENTLY UNDER WAY OR CONTEMPLATED TO HELP REDUCE IT WILL SEEM SUFFICIENT TO LATTER. LDC'S WILL PERSIST IN BANNING TOGETHER IN ATTEMPT CLOSE GAP OR INCREASE RATE AT WHICH IT BEING CLOSED. U.S. MUST RESIGN ITSELF TO THIS CONTINUED UNIFIED OPPOSITION -- WHOSE UNITY WILL BREAK DOWN ONLY OCCASIONALLY ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. U.S. RESPONSE SHOULD BE TO CONTAIN AND INSTITUTIONALIZE LDC-DC DIFFERENCES MUCH AS IS DONE WITH REGARD LIMITING OPPOSING BUSINESS AND LABOR INTERESTS IN EFFECTIVE LABOR RELATIONS.

5. IN PURSUANCE THIS POLICY, WE MUST AGREE EXAMINE SERIOUSLY ALL LDC PROPOSALS -- EVEN GIVE A HEARING TO SUCH APPARENTLY RADICAL AND IMPRACTICAL PROPOSALS AS ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK BETWEEN EXPORT

PRICES OF LDC RAW MATERIALS AND DC MANUFACTURES. OTHERWISE WE WILL NOT BE HEARD BY LDC'S. WHENEVER POSSIBLE WE MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS SDR LINKS AND APPLICATIONS OF REASONABLE CONTROLS TO MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. WE MUST NOT ONLY LOOK MORE FAVORABLY AT COMMODITY AGREEMENTS BUT RECOGNIZE THAT PRODUCER CARTELS ARE GOING TO BE FORMED AND WOULD BE FUTILE FOR US CHALLENGE THEIR RIGHT TO EXISTENCE.

6. WE SHOULD AVOID EXPENDING OUR POLITICAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES IN USELESS RHETORICAL BATTLES AND LOST CAUSES AND IF POSSIBLE, AVOID BEING ISOLATED FROM OUR WEO ALLIES. WE SHOULD ACCEPT FACT OF BEING OUTVOTED IN UN ON ISSUES WHERE WE HAVE NO FLEXIBILITY AND DECLINE DUBIOUS TEMPTATION TO TWIST ARMS TO RECRUIT SUPPORT FOR ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES. FACT THAT ON MOST NACG MATTERS WE ARE IN MINORITY NEED NOT HARM US IN MANY CASES WHERE RESOLUTIONS INOPERATIVE WITHOUT OUT AND OTHER WESTERN COOPERATION. SOVIETS MANAGED ACCEPT THEIR MINORITY POSITION FOR TWENTY YEARS WITHOUT GREAT DAMAGE. WE SHOULD ADMIT OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS OFTEN IN CONFLICT LDC'S, ESPECIALLY WHEN OUR MORAL POSITION BOLSTERED, BY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE U.S. PROVIDES, BY REPUTATION FOR DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, BY OUR SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH SHARED WITH WORLD, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND BY U.S. ROLE AS PEACE MAKER, FOR EXAMPLE, IN MIDDLE EAST.

7. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, NEED MAJOR EFFORT TO CONVINCE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS THAT U.S. CAN LIVE WITH MINORITY POSITION ON MANY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. DIFFICULT AND MAJOR EFFORT ALSO WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONVINCE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS OF RIGHT OF LDC'S TO PURSUE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC INTERESTS -- I.E., DISAGREE WITH U.S. -- AND TO CONVINCE THEM OF NEED TO CONFINE OUR CONFLICTS WITH LDC'S WITHIN LIMITS IN INSTITUTIONALIZED MANNER.

8. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS SPECIFICALLY POSED IN REFTEL.

A. AFRICANS WILL TAILOR POLICIES TO ATTEMPT GET FROM ARABS WHAT THEY WANT FROM ARABS AND DC'S WHAT THEY WANT FROM THEM. THUS WE SEE NO INCONSISTENCY IN LDC'S DEMANDING GREATER ARAB AID AND SIMULTANEOUSLY UNITING WITH ARABS IN NACG AGAINST DC AND U.S. POLICIES. SENGHOR CLEARLY PURSUING THIS TACK. HE HAS CONTINUALLY STRESSED AFRO-ARAB UNITY WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY VOICING DISPLEASURE WITH AMOUNT OF ARAB AID. MOREOVER, HE HAS HAD LIMITED SUCCESS, AT LEAST WITH REGARD ARABS, AS

IMPORTANT SAUDI AND KUWAITI AID IS IN PROSPECT. SIMILARLY,
GOS UNLIKELY OPPOSE IRANIAN ECONOMIC POLICIES.

B. NOT APPLICABLE.

C. LIKELY DEVOTION OF A PARTICULAR STATE TO
NACG UNITY WILL WANE ON ISOLATED ISSUES WHEN LONG TERM AND REAL
INTEREST OF THAT LDC IN SUCH UNITY OUTWEIGHED BY IMMEDIATE SHORT-
TERM GAINS. HOWEVER, UNITY WILL PERSIST AND BE IMPORTANT
FACTOR LATER AND ON OTHER ISSUES. AFRICANS CAN SEE
THROUGH ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER SURREPTITIOUSLY.
WE SHOULD OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE OUR APPEAL TO EACH INDIVIDUAL
NATION'S INTERESTS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN TRYING WEAKEN EFFECTS
OF CARTELS ON EXPORT PRICES WHEN THOSE INTEREST DIFFER
FROM THOSE OF LDC'S AND NOT CONFINE OURSELVES TO ARGUMENT
WE SEEKING WORLD'S GREATER GOOD, EVEN WHEN IT IS CASE.
JUST AS WE CANNOT EXPECT LDC'S SACRIFICE THEIR OWN INTERESTS
IN UNIFIED LDC FRONT TO SMOOTH FUNCTIONING STABLE, INTER-
DEPENDENT, WORLD ECONOMY, WE CAN PROFIT WHEN THEY DO NOT
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SACRIFICE THOSE INTERESTS TO SMOOTH FUNCTIONING, STABLE
NACG CONSENSUS.

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NEA-14 DRC-01 /263 W

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D. NO COMMENT.

E. SENEGAL IS WEDDED TO OAU AFRICAN CONSENSUS ON MOST POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES OF CONCERN TO NACG. BREAK OF RELATINS WITH ISRAEL, ROLE AT UNGA SPECIAL SESSION, AND ADHERENCE TO OAU LAW OF SEA CONSENSUS THREE RECENT EXAMPLES. WE BELIEVE THERE WILL BE STRONG TENDENCY SENEGAL AND OTHER AFRICAN LDCS TO CONTINUE ACCEPT OAU AND NACG CONSENSUSES UNLESS THEY RUN CONTRARY TO SOME SPECIFIC INTEREST IN ISOLATED CASES.

F. BELIEVE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES WE MUST REACH KEY INDIVIDUALS IN EACH LDC. THIS BOTH A PROBLEM AND AN OPPORTUNITY. SEE PARA 9 BELOW.

G. INCREASED SOLIDARITY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES SEEMS TO BE ALREADY SPREADING TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES AT LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE. GOS SOLIDARITY WITH COMMUNIST NATIONALS AND GROUPS IN ASIA MAY BE ANOTHER EXAMPLE (GRUNK, CONFIDENTIAL

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NORTH VIETNAM AND PRG).

H. IN ORDER ACHIEVE APPRECIATION BY LDCS OF CONGRUENT INTERESTS WITH U.S., WE NEED RECOGNIZE LDC DIGNITY AND POWER. ACCEPT WITH GRACE THOSE ECONOMIC POWERPLAYS DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS AS WE CANNOT FORESTALL, FOR EXAMPLE, AS WE HAVE DONE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH OPEC COUNTRIES. NEGOTIATE ALL POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES TO EXTENT POSSIBLE, CONFERRING BENEFITS TO THOSE WHO, FOR REASONS RELATED OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, SUPPORT OUR POSITION AND COSTS ON THOSE WHO DO NOT. HOWEVER, DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST ANY LDC SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE WHO WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY LIMITS OR INSTITUTIONALIZATION (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE) ON THEIR ECONOMIC CONFLICT WITH U.S. AND OTHER DCS, NOT MERELY THOSE WHO OPPOSE US BECAUSE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO.

I. STOCK OF ALGERIA AND IRAN BOTH HIGH IN SENEGAL. BELIEVE WE MUST DEVOTE INCREASING ATTENTION, HOWEVER, TO THOSE ON SECOND LEVEL OF INFLUENCE: IN AFRICA, NOT ONLY SUCH COUNTRIES AS ALGERIA, NIGERIA, ZAIRE, BUT OTHERS SUCH AS IVORY COAST, SENEGAL, KENYA, CAMEROON, GHANA. PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED CONSULTATION BELOW WOULD HELP

ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

J. EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF MAJOR US INVOLVEMENTS WITH
LDCS -- U.S. POSITION ON SDR LINK.

FRUITFUL EXAMPLE U.S. INVOLVEMENT -- WORLD FOOD
CONFERENCE, SAHELIAN AID.

K. ANSWERED BELOW.

9. IN CONCLUSION, EMBASSY MAKING FOLLOWING PROPOSAL
FORMULATED WITH MOSTLY AFRICAN LDCS IN MIND WHICH MAY BE
VALID FOR OTHER LDCS AND WHICH COULD HELP DEVELOP NEW ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP WITH LDCS TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

A. MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE ONLY SMALL NUMBER
OF ELITE DETERMINING THEIR POSITION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES
SUCH AS THOSE DISCUSSED THIS CABLE. THESE GENERALLY
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INCLUDE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF FINANCE, PERHAPS
TWO OR THREE CIVIL SERVANTS, AND HEAD UN DELEGATION.
IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICIES OF AFRICAN NATIONS, WE MUST REACH THOSE
INDIVIDUALS. WHILE GREAT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES UNDOUBTEDLY
INVOLVED, WE SUGGEST FORMATION OF US CONSULTING GROUP
HEADED BY SOMEONE OF AMBASSADORIAL RANK TO CONSULT ON
AD HOC OR PERIODIC BASIS WITH HIGH LEVEL AFRICAN
AND OTHER LDC DELEGATIONS IN WASHINGTON OR LDC CAPITAL.
HEART OF PROPOSAL IS THAT CONSULTATION MUST BE BILATERAL,
NOT RPT NOT MULTILATERAL. PROBABLY ONLY IN THIS WAY, IN
FORMAL PREPARED TALKS, COULD WE REACH LEVEL OF HIGH LDC
OFFICIALS AND EXPECT TO, FOR EXAMPLE, OBTAIN
PARTICIPATION IN WASHINGTON OR THEIR HOME CAPITAL OF LDC
AMBASSADORS TO UN.

B. IF SUCH A PROCEDURE CARRIED OUT, ROUGHLY
SIMILAR IN CONCEPT TO BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH JAPAN,
SAUDI ARABIA AND DCS, OUR AMBASSADORS IN LDCS COULD
PROBABLY FIND WAY TO INVOLVE PRIME MINISTERS AND PRESIDENTS
WITH TALKS, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY, THROUGH BRIEFING AND
DISCUSSION IN PRIVATE MEETING OBVIOUS AMERICAN HEAD OF
DELEGATION WOULD HAVE TO HAVE SUFFICIENT PRESTIGE AND
CLOSENESS TO POLICY FORMING ORGANS OF USG TO ATTRACT
BUSY, PROTOCOL CONSCIOUS, AND PROUD LDC MINISTERS.
HOWEVER, WOULD BE SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO WHOLE
DELEGATION AND REPRESENTATIVE FROM US EMBASSY IN EACH LDC COULD
ASSIST IN PROVIDING DETAILED KNOWLEDGE TO MAIN US
CONSULTING GROUP.

C BODY COULD BE INSTITUTED ON AD HOC BASIS TO
CONSULT WITH 10-20 LDCS AND CONTINUE ON PERMANENT BASIS
OR NOT AS EXPERIENCE DICTATES. US GROUP WOULD MAKE
SELECTION LDCS TO BE CONSULTED ON BASIS INFLUENCE
INDIVIDUAL LDC, USG ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AND PINNDOWN KEY
LDC LEADERS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO AFRICANS AND US. EVEN ONE TIME
USE US CONSULTATIVE GROUP WOULD BE SURE FOCUS LDC
ATTENTION ON SERIOUSNESS WHICH US REGARDS LDC VIEWS AND WOULD
ENABLE US EXPLAIN US VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICIES TO LDCS, TO HAVE THEIR VIEWS IN RETURN, HE WOULD
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ALSO INTRODUCE GREATER REALISM IN LDC ECONOMIC
CALCULATIONS, HELP CUT DOWN SURPRISES AT INTERNATIONAL
MEETINGS AND HELP DEVELOP ATTITUDE OF COMMON APPROACH TO
ECONOMIC PROBLEM SOLVING. HOWEVER, US GROUP MUST HAVE OPPORTUNITY
TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WITH SAME LEADERS
WHOM IT MET WITH IN BILATERAL CONSULTATION AND MUST HAVE ABILITY
INFLUENCE US POLICY ON BASIS ITS FINDINGS IN ORDER
HAVE CREDIBILITY WITH LDC LEADERS.
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